A considerable literature exists on the political transition in South Africa, yet within this body of work, certain aspects of vital importance to our understanding of the period remain under explored. This article focuses in detail on the twilight of the ANC's armed struggle in the years leading to August 1990, and the effect that the organisation's waning military campaign had on two developments, namely, the process of moving the ANC towards negotiations, and secondly, the subsequent stalemate that occurred between the ANC and the National Party (NP) government over the issue of 'talks about talks'. The full dimensions of the crisis facing the ANC and its military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) on the eve of negotiations, and the centrality of the issue of the armed struggle to the stalemate in negotiations are two issues which have not been given due emphasis in any existing account of the transition. This article will explore both issues and explain the paradox that in spite of the material weakness of MK's challenge to the state, the issue of armed struggle became the focus of a trial of strength between the ANC and the National Party, waged in a war of words, and fought through the domestic and international media, as the two sides jockeyed for position on the road to formal negotiations.
electricity, fridges, stoves, and in many cases, televisions. On the other were MK temporary residents who stayed in accommodation without electricity, and often no mattresses. In Lusaka MK members lived in Chunga, Kaunda Square and Mtendere, the poorest townships in the city, while regular ANC members lived in Helen Kaunda, a modestly affluent part of the city, amongst the Zambian middle class. While regular ANC residents received money which allowed them to buy their own goods, MK members did not. Instead they received 'underground supplies' of meat and vegetables provided by the regional military command. If they wanted to buy anything, they had to sell their supplies, which was illegal. They voiced their frustrations to their commanders repeatedly, but nothing effective was done to remedy their situation. Anderson's boss, Keith Mokoape, the MK Head of Intelligence, told him that because the number of MK operations was perceived to be declining, there was 'one objective and one alone' for the intelligence department in helping to plan operations: this was 'to make the graph of actions go up, irrespective of what actions [were undertaken], irrespective of responsible for prosecuting the ANC's revolutionary struggle, where MK's record came under withering criticism. Apparently this led Modise to offer his resignation, but this was promptly refused and further discussion of the matter was terminated abruptly. 4 MK's crisis had diplomatic repercussions for the ANC's relations with the Zambian government, and these came to a head in mid-1989. On 7 May 1989, an ANC member shot dead his Zambian girlfriend and then himself in Mtendere in the second incident within a month in which ANC members had killed Zambian nationals. Understandably, the issue aroused the concern of the local authorities and on 9 May, Alex Shapi, the Zambian Secretary of State for Defence and Security, issued a stern warning that his government would 'not allow anyone to play around with guns even if he is a freedomfighter'. Shapi vowed to prosecute law-breaking ANC guerrillas, but added that Zambia would not act unilaterally to disarm MK. In its response the ANC announced that it was looking into the matter of the misuse of firearms by some of its members and promised to take appropriate action where necessary. On 19 May 1989, Shapi announced at a news conference that the ANC had begun disarming some of its members in Zambia. Then on 25 May, Tom Sebina, the ANC's spokesman confirmed this, stating that whilst the movement was not being left 'naked and defenceless', it had decided to ensure that discipline was preserved by its personnel. The process of disarming MK guerrillas in Lusaka was carried out by ANC security in co-operation with the Zambian security forces. Broadcasts, 20 May 1989, explosive device detonated at a house belonging to the ANC in Kamanga township in Lusaka. It was the latest in a series of bomb attacks on ANC houses, all within the space of a few months, in which one man had been killed and at least three ANC members seriously wounded. At the time it was assumed that the attacks were the work of agents of the South African government. However on 11 August, the Zambian Daily Mail reported that the ANC had arrested four of its former cadres for the attacks. The arrests created another confrontation with the local authorities, for it transpired that the men had applied for refugee status with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Zambia, and were awaiting resettlement by the commission at the time of their apprehension. Furthermore, one of the men had in fact been arrested by ANC security outside the UNHCR office in Lusaka. Both the Zambian government and the UNHCR were furious. They charged that the four had been abducted and demanded that the ANC release them. This marked the first time that Zambia had spoken publicly on the subject of ANC dissidents. Amidst the furore, a relative of one of the detainees announced that 32 South African exiles in Zambia had been arrested and beaten by ANC security men, and claimed that the dissidents' aim was to highlight the lack of democracy and poor conditions that existed within the ANC-in-exile. In Sweden, at the same time, twelve defectors from the ANC were fighting deportation. African leaders were scheduled to meet in Harare, Zimbabwe, on 21-22 August to discuss a peace plan that the ANC had formulated setting forth its preconditions for engaging in negotiations with the South African regime. It was in the interests of neither the ANC nor the Zambian government for the impression to gather that the former was exploring the possibilities of a peaceful settlement as a consequence of having its military options paralysed by the latter. A number of reports in the media at the time were making this claim. On the basis of their common interest, the two parties acted to defuse the crisis.
On 18 August, the four men detained by the ANC in connection with the bombings were handed to Zambian authorities. 9 In the following days the ANC and the Zambian government undertook to discredit the reports of an ANC expulsion, dismissing them as 'utter rubbish', and, in the words of a special assistant to President Kuanda, a 'deliberate and malicious ploy to try and drive a wedge between the ANC and the Zambian government'. In the meanwhile, Alex Shapi declared that the ANC was in Zambia to stay 'until apartheid is dismantled' and an ANC statement dismissed the stories as 'absolute nonsense'.
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Despite these avowals, the story had not died down by the time the OAU meeting in
Harare commenced, and both Zambia and the ANC were once again compelled to deny the reports. ANC delegates stated that the movement had in fact begun moving its guerrillas out of Zambia two years previously, while Kaunda said at a news conference at the end of the meeting on 22 Although the conflict had thus moved decisively in the direction of a peaceful settlement, the issue of violence remained the roadblock to negotiations. Whilst the terms of the Harare Declaration set the ANC's preconditions for talks, for the NP, the demands of the declaration could not be conceded until the ANC abandoned its commitment to violence. As the NP's Constitutional Development Minister Gerrit Viljoen stated on 17
October in an interview on a state-run black radio station, the government's sole condition was that: 'People should commit themselves to a peaceful negotiating process.
If they comply with that requirement, I'm sure virtually all restrictions that exist at present would have to be reconsidered and have to be revoked.'
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For its part, the ANC felt that it could not commit itself to unilaterally renounce the use of force, because whilst the idea of MK as an effective military force may have been a myth, it was an incredibly potent one amongst the black masses within South Africa.
This was displayed at the first mass rally addressed by the newly released political prisoners, which took place on 28 October in front of an estimated 70,000 people at the recently opened Soccer City stadium on the outskirts of Soweto. There the crowd did the toyi-toyi -a muscular march mimicking the movements of MK guerrillas in training.
Meanwhile, when Walter Sisulu and other ANC stalwartsemerged from beneath the grandstands; they were escorted by an honour guard of twenty young militants clad in khaki uniforms, marching in military style. The rally spokesman informed observers that these escorts were 'symbolic' of MK. In his keynote speech, Sisulu reaffirmed the ANC's policy that it would not abandon the armed struggle unless the government met its terms. had released senior ANC leaders and was considering entering into talks, this had to be attributable to pressure imposed on it by the movement, above all through its armed struggle. However the rhetoric and militancy on display at the rally on 28 fell on 16 December and 8 January respectively, were devoted to making resolutions to do better in the coming year. In a public statement on 15 December, timed to coincide with the MK anniversary the following day, the ANC acknowledged the fall in its military attacks compared with the previous year, and vowed to correct the 'imbalance'
between the armed struggle and other forms of activism in 1990. 16 Meanwhile on 8
January, in statements to the international media, Chris Hani again vowed to step up attacks within South Africa. He attributed the decline in attacks in 1989 to logistical problems related to the move from Angola and the further infiltration of the movement in previous years by former cadres who had been recruited by the police. Now the 'process of re-establishment and re-organisation' was complete and the necessary lessons had been learned, he said. On negotiations, he commented that it was possible that a ceasefire might occur, but that such an act 'must not be unilateral. It will have to be binding on both the ANC and the South African government'.
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The seven ANC prisoners released in October 1989 arrived in Lusaka on 15 January 1990 along with Harry Gwala, another ANC activist, for three days of talks during which they sought the external movement's views on the question of negotiations. was open to the public, he mistakenly delivered a speech that was intended for a closed session of the meeting. In front of an audience that included the international press corps and President Kaunda, he wondered aloud whether the ANC should call it a day as far as the the armed struggle was concerned, in the event of the organisation being unbanned and 'operate solely as a legal movement', or whether it should 'continue to maintain some underground units' in South Africa. He advocated the latter course, saying that the 'armed struggle must continue', but then went on to inform the gathered audience that 'looking at our situation realistically we must admit that we do not have the capacity within our country to intensify the armed struggle in any meaningful way'. He went on to say that , 'it may therefore be that the main military task that we should pay attention to is precisely the building up of that capacity within the country both to be able to fight effectively should the need arise and to have sizeable forces at the moment when a new Significantly, the changes he announced were strongly qualified by the prohibitions that remained. In a press briefing to South African journalists a few hours before his speech, Meanwhile, MK's weakness on the ground in South Africa was highlighted by events in March. The first direct talks between the ANC and NP about overcoming the obstacles to formal negotiations were scheduled to commence on 11
April, but after the 'Sebokeng Massacre' of 26 March when police shot dead 11 protesters, the ANC announced on 31 March that it was pulling out of talks 'indefinitely'.
However, after an emergency meeting between de Klerk and Mandela in early April, the talks were rescheduled for 2-4 May in Cape Town. Significantly, MK had been invisible in this whole process. It had proved itself unable to either protect the ANC's supporters or avenge their deaths.
A stalemate had been reached in the conflict. The ANC's policy was one of neither peace, nor war. It emphasised that it was not continuing with violence in order to overthrow the state -for -it was not rejecting the possibility of a peaceful settlement or acting in bad faith to undermine talks -but rather that the armed struggle was being maintained in order to pressure the government into submitting to the terms of the Harare Declaration. MK, however, was incapable of intensifying its military pressure.
Meanwhile, the NP continued to insist on a commitment to purely peaceful methods of struggle by its adversaries as the essential precondition for any further relaxation of security measures.
Therefore, when the two sides met for 'talks about talks' (i.e. a discussion of the terms under which they would agree to begin formal constitutional negotiations) at Groote Schuur mansion in Cape Town on 2 May, behind the bonhomie of the delegates, the impasse remained. In a joint statement after the first four hour meeting on 2 May, seven obstacles to substantive talks were listed: security laws, the return of black exiles, the presence of troops in black townships, the release of political prisoners, the state of emergency, the ANC's commitment to armed struggle, and continued violence in black communities. The armed struggle was the only obstacle raised by the government, the others were ANC demands. A consideration of MK's actual weakness highlights just how little leverage the ANC actually possessed during these talks.
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The matter created a furious dispute on the evening of 4 May when Joe Slovo, who was part of the talks at Groote Schuur, submitted the minute to Mac Maharaj who was in South Africa illegally as part of a project dubbed 'Operation Vula', which aimed at establishing an underground ANC leadership presence within South Africa capable of coordinating all aspects of resistance -including armed struggle -against the state. Maharaj It was after a speech, delivered to 3,000 students at the University of Transkei on 18
July 1990, where Hani declared that the ANC was continuing to infiltrate guerrillas into South Africa because the correct conditions for negotiations were yet to be created, whilst adding that MK might have to 'seize power' if the government appeared unwilling to At a rally on the Friday, Hani commented on the contretemps. He said he had no regrets regarding his comments that had ostensibly offended de Klerk, and that he hoped that they would not be used as a 'red herring' by the government to derail the next round of talks. He reiterated that MK was being strengthened and that this was no a secret. Negotiations had to lead to the transfer of power to the people and the government would have to surrender power to a democratic majority, he added. Hani said his rhetoric on armed struggle was not bravado but a serious declaration of MK's intention to fight. He did not see the incident affecting the next round of talks between the ANC and the government, and added that he would only stop commenting on violence when the ANC declared the time had come for a cease-fire.
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What Hani perhaps did not know was that at the time he was speaking Operation Vula was being smashed. The government's agenda in making such an inordinate fuss of his comments became clearer on 22 July, when the lead story in South Africa's Sunday newspapers was of the exposure of a 'conspiracy' that the security forces had managed to foil. The police's tactic was to selectively leak details of the investigation to the media during the following days. The state was keen to link the speech made by Hani, a senior South African Communist Party (SACP) member, to the uncovering of the plot, as part of their claim that Vula was a conspiracy involving an elite unit of the SACP acting within the ANC, but outside its command structure. Police alleged that the investigation that led to the arrests was launched following Hani's comments, whilst a government spokesman intoned ominously that if a link was proved between Hani's threats and the uncovered plot, then the issue would 'very much be a stumbling block to negotiations'. The ANC National Executive Committee met on Monday 23 July for a two-day meeting to decide its policy in preparation for the next round of 'talks about talks' scheduled for 6 August. The National Executive charged that the government had timed its announcement of the arrests in order to put pressure on Mandela to renounce the armed struggle. 35 On the same day, Joe Slovo also accused the government of bad faith and said that the announcement of the arrests was all an attempt to derail a mass rally that the SACP had scheduled for 29 July, where it planned to officially launch itself as a legal organisation inside South Africa. 'It is our mass popularity, not some fabricated "red plot" that really worries de Klerk', he charged.
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On July 25, the day after the ANC National Executive concluded its strategy meeting, Mac Maharaj was arrested under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act, thereby becoming the first member of the ANC National Executive Committee to be apprehended for involvement with Operation Vula. At a news conference on the same day, Nelson
Mandela tried to suggest that the violations were due to difficulties the ANC had experienced in communicating with its underground members in South Africa, some of whom had been infiltrated before 2 May and were 'still operating according to the old instructions'. Mandela said that the movement had been diligently 'trying to reach all of them to convey decisions taken at Groote Schuur'. The government's strategy was two-fold. First, as mentioned, it sought to exploit the affair to drive a wedge between the ANC and SACP. Second, on the basis of the material that had been seized, it was aware that the ANC was intending to announce the suspension of its armed struggle at the next talks about talks, and that the movement hoped to present its act as a magnanimous, voluntary gesture to facilitate formal negotiations. The government's goal was to ratchet up the pressure to make the unilateral suspension appear a capitulation.
The government's first aim soon unravelled. It assumed that the 'Comrade Joe' referred to in the minutes of the meeting in Tongaat was Joe Slovo. However, Slovo was able to produce his passport, which proved that at the time of the meeting he was actually in Lusaka. In fact, the 'Comrade Joe' referred to in the minutes was Siphiwe Nyanda. On 
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The ANC immediately went on a propaganda offensive to sell the ceasefire to the masses in order to minimise the political fallout. It was a hard sell. In fact, as Joe Slovo later confessed, in his estimation '90 percent of ANC supporters thought the decision was a sellout'. 44 Slovo began the campaign on the day of the release of the Pretoria Minute, threatening that the ANC would resume arms the moment it became clear that the government was not honouring the agreement. 45 The ANC's line was that the ceasefire was conditional, that the security forces were effectively on probation, and that a return to the armed struggle remained an option. The organisation placed an advertisement in the press the day after the agreement to this effect which declared: 'The armed struggle has not been abandoned…The people's army, Umkhonto we Sizwe, has not been dissolved;
we have not forfeited our right to self-defence…continued suspension is conditional on the behaviour of the South African police and defence force.' 46 On 12 August 1990 Chris
Hani spoke to students in Umtata in the Transkei of the need for the soldiers of the liberation struggle to remain 'in the trenches' waiting for orders from the ANC whilst on the same day Harry Gwala, another hardliner, spoke of seizing power and of 'teeth for teeth '. 47 In reality, and contrary to the rhetoric, the ANC leadership had no intention of going back. Once again, it is important to distinguish between the ANC's public and private stances on the question of violence. As noted, the ANC's public relations campaign following 7 August emphasised that the right of 'self-defence' was being maintained, and that the suspension was conditional on the security forces' behaviour. However, as National Executive Committee member James Stuart later recalled, in the days immediately following the ceasefire 'a wave of violence was unleashed against the ANC'
by 'elements of state security' and their surrogates. However, he added, in the face of this onslaught, the leadership 'resisted the temptation to resort once again to the armed struggle because we knew that that would be the end of the ANC as an organisation of such high prestige and such high authority, both in the country and internationally. I think that would have destroyed us completely'.
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In August 1990 the stalemate was broken. By this time the ANC felt that it had held out against the government's demands long enough for its decision to suspend its armed struggle to be seen as a voluntary, magnanimous act rather than a capitulation. However,
Conclusion
This article has illustrated certain aspects of the crisis that faced the ANC on the eve of its legalisation in February 1990 and how these led to a situation whereby the ANC was rendered incapable of intensifying its armed struggle within South Africa beyond the low-level it had fallen to in the late 1980s. The article also discussed the ostensibly paradoxical fact that after the unbanning of the ANC, the sole obstacle that impeded the commencement of formal talks between the movement and the government was MK's armed struggle, in spite of both sides acknowledging its negligible military significance.
The real issue at stake was the terms under which the ANC would enter into negotiations and specifically, whether it would do so as a triumphant liberation movement or not.
When the government stated that its sole condition for talks was that the ANC should unilaterally renounce violence, its aim was to strip the credibility of the movement's claims that it had secured South Africa's liberation through its own efforts. Victorious armies do not disarm unilaterally at the behest of vanquished foes. Naturally the ANC resisted this and a stalemate resulted. 
